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n  Business tax incentives are often 
costly: only a minority of targeted jobs 
are created due to the incentives, and 
fiscal benefits offset only a modest 
portion of direct costs.
n  How incentives are paid for is key 
to their net benefits. Education cuts 
reduce future wages.
n  Incentives are more cost-effective if 
targeted at industries that create more 
jobs in other local businesses.
n  Customized services to small and 
medium-sized businesses are a cost-
effective way to create local jobs.
n  Reforming incentives is politically 
difficult because there are many large 
beneficiaries in the short-run, while 
the costs due to lower wages occur 
over the long-run.  
For more details and recommendations, see 
the full report’s Executive Summary, Economic 
Development Incentives: Who Benefits? Who 
Pays the Costs? How Can They Be Improved?
For additional details, see the full report, 
Who Benefits from Economic Development 
Incentives? 
These can be found at www.upjohn.org.
State and local governments increasingly rely on business incentives, such as job 
creation tax credits and property tax abatements, to attract jobs. Costs of incentives have 
tripled since 1990, reaching $45 billion per year, or about what state governments take 
in from corporate income taxes. Recent incentives to Foxconn and Amazon suggest this 
competition may escalate.
Incentives can have large local benefits. If incentives tip a business’s location decision, 
this directly creates local jobs. This job creation has “multiplier effects”: other local jobs 
are created in supplier industries or retailers. Job growth helps local workers and boosts 
tax revenue. 
But costs of incentives can be high. If incentives paid for themselves through increased 
tax revenue, as economic development agencies often assert, their costs would be no 
issue. However, research shows that average-sized incentives tip less than 20 percent of 
business location decisions, meaning that over 80 percent of targeted jobs would still 
have been created without the incentives. State and local governments thus give away 
more than $30 billion a year in incentives that create zero jobs. In addition, local job 
growth attracts in-migrants, which increases public spending needs. As a result, the fiscal 
benefits from incentives are far less than their direct costs. Budget costs of incentives 
must be paid for by higher tax rates or public spending cuts. These budget changes can 
harm local economies, such as by hurting public school quality and thus the skills of local 
workers. 
Incentive reforms should rein in costs while promoting job growth. I make three 
recommendations:
1. Put budget caps on tax incentives. These caps help avoid financing incentives 
through cuts in important services such as public education. When public school 
spending is cut, future wages tend to fall.
2. Restrict tax incentives by targeting only high-multiplier industries. Tax 
incentives can make sense if, for every job created directly by the incentives, five 
other local jobs are created—that is, the “job multiplier” is 6. Some industries, 
particularly in advanced manufacturing, have higher multipliers and provide more 
benefits per dollar of incentives. 
3. Expand customized services to locally owned, small and medium-sized 
businesses. Customized business services such as specialized job training and 
manufacturing extension can be 10 times as effective as tax incentives in creating 
local jobs. These services are most useful to small and medium-sized businesses, 
which often lack the funds and information of larger businesses. Locally owned 
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The Effects of Different Economic Development Incentive Policies
To compare different incentive reforms, I conduct several “thought experiments” 
that illustrate how a specific reform affects a key outcome: the average incomes of a 
state’s residents. For an apples-to-apples comparison, I assume each policy involves the 
government offering incentives equal to 1 percent of the state’s personal income each 
year. This magnitude is in line with the offerings of high-incentive states and localities. 
I create a baseline incentive policy against which to compare reforms. This baseline 
policy makes two assumptions that reflect characteristics of typical incentive policies:
• The baseline incentive policy is paid for by an even split of increased taxes and 
public spending cuts. This choice is arbitrary but neutral. Based on average state 
and local budget patterns, 11 percent of financing comes from cuts in K–12 
education spending alone.
• For every job created directly by the incentives, 1.5 other local jobs are created in 
supplier industries and local retailers. This means the job multiplier is 2.5, which is 
common for average manufacturing industries.
Figure 1 shows how residents’ per-capita incomes change for four different incentive 
policies: the baseline policy and three alternative “thought experiment” policies.
The baseline incentive policy has slight net benefits. Per-capita income rises by 0.2 
percent. The incentive policy creates jobs for residents, increases property values, and 
generates tax revenue. But it also has a high cost per job created. The additional revenue 
does not fully cover the policy’s sticker price, and the share of incentives financed by cuts 
in public school spending reduces future wages.
Now consider the same tax incentives, with one change: the incentive package is 
solely financed by cuts in public school spending. This policy reduces average per-
capita income of residents by over 4 percent. The short-term benefits of more jobs are 
outweighed by the long-term losses in wages due to public school spending cuts.
Suppose we return to the baseline incentive financing, but assume that tax incentives 
are targeted at industries with a job multiplier of 6.0 rather than 2.5. Some high-tech 
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Figure 1  How Four Different Incentive Policies Affect State Residents: Percentage 
Effects on Per-Capita Income
NOTE: These four incentive policies all have the same cost: 1 percent of total personal income of state residents.
SOURCE: Executive Summary to Bartik (2018).
Incentives financed by 
cuts in public schools 
reduce per-capita income 
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manufacturing may have multipliers as great as 6.0. Such high multipliers are in part 
due to what are called “agglomeration economies” or “cluster effects”: a local cluster of 
high-tech firms can benefit from transferring ideas and workers among each other, and 
from local specialized services. With the higher multiplier, this incentive policy increases 
per-capita income by 3 percent, more than 10 times the baseline incentive policy.
Finally, instead of a tax incentive, suppose we provide customized services to locally 
owned small and medium-sized businesses. These services may include specialized job 
training and manufacturing extension services. Studies have found these customized 
services, when done well, can have job-creation effects 10 times those of tax incentives. 
Because of the target of local businesses, any expansion of sales at assisted businesses may 
come at the expense of reduced sales at other competing local businesses. However, this 
is counterbalanced by locally owned businesses and their owners spending more at local 
suppliers and retailers. This policy increases residents’ per-capita incomes by almost 6 
percent—over 25 times the baseline tax incentive package.
The Advantage of Data-Driven Simulation over Development Agency Assumptions
These estimates come from a simulation model built on credible studies of how 
incentives and job creation affect local economies. Essentially, the model uses the 
findings of these studies to determine how incentive design affects local job creation, 
per-capita income, and other local economic outcomes. These outcomes are linked 
in a causal chain. For example, an incentive policy has some probability of tipping a 
business location decision, and when scaled by the number of jobs targeted, yields the 
expected number of local jobs created. Each of these created local jobs in turn can create 
additional jobs through the job multiplier effect, through either suppliers to the targeted 
firm or local retailers who sell to the firm’s workers. Some of these new jobs go to local 
residents and increase earnings, while other jobs go to people who move into the area 
and thus affect population growth. Research has shown that for every increase of 10 local 
jobs, local population will eventually rise sufficiently that 8 extra jobs go to in-migrant 
workers.
The new jobs increase state and local tax revenue, but the added population requires 
additional spending on public services to maintain quality. The extra tax revenue less the 
required spending represents a fiscal benefit to the government. This fiscal benefit offsets 
the incentive’s “sticker price”—the dollars either paid to incented firms or forgone from 
not collecting taxes from them. If the fiscal benefit is less than the sticker price, there 
is a net budget cost for the incentive, which must be paid for; for example, by cutting 
some other public service (such as education). The model’s power comes from flexibility 
in considering alternatives such as how net budget costs are paid for, the size of the job 
multiplier, and the cost-effectiveness of economic development programs in creating jobs 
in targeted firms.
In contrast, economic development agencies often make simpler assumptions that are 
not research based. For instance, economic developers often assume that every new job 
created in assisted firms is due to the incentives; that is, it would not have been created 
“but for” the incentives. Credible studies, however, find that average-sized tax incentives 
tip less than one-fifth of business location decisions, implying that most targeted jobs 
would have been created even without the incentives.
Moreover, economic developers often take credit for increases in tax revenue but 
ignore the effects of extra population on public spending. Studies show, however, that 
growth-induced spending needs can absorb upwards of 90 percent of the additional tax 
revenue, and the simulation model takes this into account. Similarly, while economic 
developers often use the sticker price of incentives as their cost, this can understate the 
true costs by failing to account for the economic costs of paying for incentives, such 
as cuts in public spending. As noted above, the simulation factors in these costs. For 
example, empirical estimates show that a 10 percent cut in K–12 education spending will 
decrease future wages by 8 percent.
Average tax incentives 
tip less than one-fifth 
of business location 
decisions.
Additionally, economic development policymakers often focus on the short term, 
but the costs from cutting education or other spending can take a generation to be fully 
realized. The simulation accounts for incentive effects over 80 years. Finally, although 
more than 90 percent of incentives are tax incentives, specialized business services 
(such as customized job training or manufacturing extension) can also help create jobs, 
especially for local small and medium-sized businesses. What’s more, these customized 
services can create jobs at one-tenth the cost of tax incentives, and the simulation 
analyzes both policies.
One potential drawback to the simulation approach is that the results may be sensitive 
to different, but still plausible, assumptions. The full report shows that alternative 
assumptions can change the magnitude of results, but that the general implications hold 
up. For instance, consider the effects on state residents’ incomes of fully financing tax 
incentives through public school spending cuts. This mechanism reduces incomes even 
if the effects of spending cuts on future wages are only one-seventh of what is assumed 
in the simulation. As another example, customized business services to locally owned 
businesses still have positive effects on incomes even if such services have a job-creation 
effectiveness only one-sixth as great as in the simulation.
Political Challenges of Reforming Incentive Policy
These recommended incentive reforms face political challenges. Demand for tax 
incentives is unlimited: any business would like the government to provide it with as 
much cash as possible. In contrast, customized business services are demanded only by 
the relatively few businesses that find such services useful, usually small and medium-
sized businesses at some critical development stage.
Therefore, the political pressure is to expand tax incentives because they have more 
and larger beneficiaries. But from the perspective of promoting better public policy, 
customized business services offer an advantage: businesses will clamor for them only if 
they are perceived to be productive. This provides pressure for development agencies to 
keep the quality up.
Another political challenge is that tax incentives often have short-run benefits but 
long-run costs. Governors and mayors are tempted to give away their successors’ tax base 
to obtain short-term political benefits from immediate job growth. The full cost, in lower 
future wages from lower education spending, will be realized only many years later. This 
political bias toward the short-term can be countered if news media and interest groups 
encourage a greater focus on what best promotes economic development over the long 
term.
Timothy J. Bartik is a senior economist at the Upjohn Institute.
Support for this project was provided by The Pew Charitable Trusts. The views expressed herein are 
those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect official views of The Pew Charitable Trusts or the 
Upjohn Institute.
Customized business 
services can create jobs at 
one-tenth the cost of tax 
incentives. 
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